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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Municipal Corporations-Control over Public Utilities
Through Zoning Ordinances
As the United States becomes increasingly an urban nation, it
finds itself beset with new and complex problems, one of which is
the conflict between the municipal power to adopt zoning ordinances,
and the power of eminent domain possessed by public utility companies. It is to be expected that as the consumer demand for electricity
grows, this conflict will present itself with increasing frequency,
as it did in Chapel Hill, North Carolina in the fall of 1961.1 Duke
Power Company had contracted with the University of North Carolina to supply the University, Chapel Hill, and the surrounding area
with increased electrical power. It was necessary for the power company to erect additional high tension transmission facilities, some
of which would be within Chapel Hill. After the power company
had purchased most of the needed right of way and had instituted
condemnation proceedings for the remainder,2 the Chapel Hill
Planning Board proposed an amendment to the local zoning ordinance which would 'have required that a Special Use Permit be
obtained by the power company prior to the erection of the proposed facilities. The net effect of such an ordinance would be to
place the municipal zoning authorities in a controlling position over
the utility inasmuch as denial of the required Use Permits by the
zoning body would frustrate attempts by the utility company to
expand its service.
The problem may be stated as a conflict between the basic interests of two state created entities. The Legislature has placed
upon the public utility companies an absolute mandate to provide
efficient electrical service on a state or area wide basis.3 In order to
facilitate the execution of this duty, the legislature has vested the
'See Durham Sun, Sept. 7, 1961, p. 9, col 1; Durham Morning Herald,
Sept. 8, 1961, § A, p. 7, col. 1.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-183 (Supp. 1963), grants the power to condemn
lands for lines, poles, towers, reservoirs, powerhouses and dams; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-184 (Supp. 1963), grants the power to condemn residences and
burial grounds when authorized to do so by the utilities commission.
'N.C. Gnu. STAT. § 62-2 (Supp. 1963).
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public utilities with the power of eminent domain ;4 control of public
utilities is placed in the hands of an administrative agency.' Whereas the concern of the public utility must of necessity be focused on
a statewide consumer group, the basic interest of a municipality
is in the more local problem presented by the welfare of the individual town and its citizens. Recognizing the very real need of
municipal authorities to adopt zoning requirements, the legislature
has granted to them the power to adopt reasonable zoning regulations designed to promote the health, safety and general welfare of
the community. 6

Municipalities see a twofold question presented in this situation. First, if a municipality has restricted an area to a particular
use, may a utility, through the use of its power of eminent domain,
override and disregard such regulation, putting the area to a forbidden use? Second, may a municipality set apart certain areas
through which a utility will be allowed to erect its facilities, and
successfully restrict the utility to that area? 7
When faced with this conflict the majority of American courts
have held that the power company is not subject to the zoning
regulation." In a case closely analogous to the Chapel Hill situa'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-183 to -184 (Supp. 1963).
The state has delegated virtually all control over public utilities to
the Public Utilities Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-32 (Supp. 1963), gives
the commission the power to regulate rates, require such service as is necessary, and general power and control over public utilities and public service
corporations.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-172 (1952) (Zoning Enabling Act); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160-176 (Supp. 1963) (changes in zoning ordinances). It is interesting to note that North Carolina has recently subjected the construction
of state owned buildings to local zoning ordinances. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160181.1 (1962). The statutes are silent as to the effect of zoning ordinances on
public utilities.
' In letters from Jack L. Legrand, Attorney for the Town of Chapel Hill,
to the Attorney General of North Carolina, September 11 and 12, 1961, the
position of the municipalities was stated thusly: "1. If property has been so
zoned under a properly enacted municipal zoning ordinance as to preclude
the use thereof for transmission line purposes by public utilities, may a public
utility nevertheless, under the right of eminent domain, proceed to condemn
such property and use it for the erection of power transmission lines?
2. May the town of Chapel Hill, through the reasonable use of its zoning
powers, regulate the location of major electrical transmission lines and towers
within the area of its zoning jurisdiction? Is the answer to this question
affected by the fact that the public utility company being regulated has been
granted the power of eminent domain ?"
' See, e.g., Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650,
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tion New York was of the opinion that the power of a local zoning
board to deny a special use permit would be equivalent to the power
to completely bar the utility from passing through the town.' The
obvious result would be to permit every political subdivision to exclude utilities, resulting in frustration of the state policy to encourage the extension of such services.'
Connecticut ruled that
where there is such a clash of interests, the interests of the municipality should be subordinated to state authority as vested in the
public utilities commission.'" Another view expressed the fear that
if local zoning boards could regulate the utility, they would do so
with the needs of the community foremost in their considerations,
to the possible detriment of the statewide consumer group.' 2 Having
103 A.2d 535 (1954) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor,
208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State ex rel. Helsel v.
Board of Comm'rs, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 698, aff'd on appeal, 83 Ohio
App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694, appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583 79 N.E.2d 911
(1948) ; Duquesnes Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105
A.2d 287 (1954).
' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295,
144 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955). There the power company wanted to
erect high tension towers in a residential section. The town had an ordinance
limiting such structures to "business zones." Although the local Board of
Zoning Appeals had authority to permit a deviation in favor of the utility,
the court ruled that the company did not have to comply with the ordinance.
New York is no stranger to this problem; see, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co.
v. Old Brookville, 72 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd 77 N.Y.S2d 143
(App. Div. 1948), dealing with the right to erect power lines contrary to
zoning ordinance. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Griffin, 297 N.Y. 897, 79
N.E.2d 738 (1948) (dealing with erection of gas manufacturing plant).
" In upholding the right of the utility to disregard the zoning ordinance,
the court said, "The question is, does this village have the right to absolutely
bar the passing through it of a high tension electric line required in the
interest of the public ....[I]t is to be noted that public utility corporations
... are created and regulated by state law. There is the absolute mandate by
state law that the petitioner shall 'furnish and provide such service, instrumentalities, and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all respects
just and reasonable.'

...

The petitioner has ... the right... and... the duty

...to erect and maintain the proposed transmission line, and no local governmental unit shall interfere with that right and duty.... The general grant of
power to a municipality to adopt zoning laws in the interest of public welfare
does not have the effect of permitting the local legislative body to override
such state law and policy." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff
Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 300, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
" Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d
535 (1954). The court stated the majority position in this manner. "[A]s
between state control and local control of a public utility furnishing a statewide service, the local municipal authorities should play a secondary role
where
1 a clash of authority appears to exist." Id at 663, 103 A.2d at 542-43.
Duquesnes Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105
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no workable statutory solution, the majority has found that the
legislative mandate to provide quality service on a statewide basis
far outweighs the possible consequences to any individual community.
Not all courts have concurred with the opinions discussed above.
The minority view would hold that compliance with the local zoning
ordinance is a condition precedent to any condemnation proceeding.18
Although authority is sparse, the minority view seems to be predicated upon the idea that a public utility like any other citizen' 4 is
bound to follow the local zoning ordinance regardless of its purpose. 15
The majority view leaves the utility with virtually unhampered
freedom; the minority goes to the other extreme. Absent any
statutory method of resolution, the courts feel that they have only
two alternatives: either to allow the utility to do as it pleases, subject only to control by the Public Utilities Commission, public
opinion, and the cost of the right of way desired; or allow the
municipality to zone as it sees fit. Neither alternative is desirable.
There is a solution which will give effect to all interests involved.
If it be conceded that a municipality has a legitimate interest in
formulation of long range municipal development plans, as expressed
by comprehensive zoning regulations, 6 or in the protection of propA.2d 287 (1954). "Any other conclusion... would render the Public Utility
Commission powerless to regulate the functioning of an electric service
company if in so doing the Commission contravened any regulation... of a
local zoning authority." Id. at 336, 105 A.2d at 298.
"aSee, e.g., State ex rel Cleveland Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio

St. 476, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959) ; New York State Elec. & Gas Co. v. Statler,
204 Misc. 7, 122 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (now overruled).
" Taber v. Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324 (1937). The
court said, "[A]n individual or private corporation... attempting... the
same project would be bound by the zoning ordinance." Id. at 526, 274 N.W.
at 325.
" Sunny Slope Water Co. v. Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672 (1934).

This decision will be of interest to the student of municipal politics. For
many years the plaintiff had been pumping water from a particular area and
selling it to residents of the town. The city changed the zoning classification

so as to exclude his business. The court ruled that the plaintiff had no vested
right in any zoning classification. He contended that the only reason the city
changed the zoning ordinance was to put him out of competition with them.
The court said that the city's motive had no bearing on the issue, as the
plaintiff's operation was unsightly and offensive to the neighborhood, which
was composed of orange groves. The city did, in fact, take over distribution
from that area and did use wells in the same general locality.
"o"It is obvious that if some utility engineer, concerned only with first
costs, operating expenses, and the efficient use to his employer, is allowed a
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erty values in the community," it should be possible to regulate the
type of structure erected. The validity of any municipal ordinance
is determined by using a two-fold test: (1) is the ordinance a
proper exercise of the police power; (2) is the ordinance reasonable
in the particular situation."8 The solution here proposed would be
to weigh any zoning ordinance called into question under the common law rules governing the police power.
The regulation of an unsightly structure can be justified upon
either aesthetic considerations or on protection of property values
within the community. The question is then presented as to whether
these motives fall within the power of a community to make reasonable rules concerning the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare.' 9 Historically courts have been reluctant to extend the
scope of the police power, particularly with respect to aesthetics.2 °
'free and unhampered' discretion, 'in his best judgment' as to the choice of
type of structure and its location, and if his sole standard of judgment is
strictly utilitarian ('the adequate service of its customers'), that it will follow
that any civic plan of good order, as expressed in zoning regulations, can
readily be reduced to a shambles." Haller, Zoning and the Utilities, 56 PuB.
UTm. FORT. 231, 235 (1955). This impassioned language was the answer
to an article by Avery, Zoning and Public Utilities, 55 PuB. Uvm. FoRT. 252
(1955) espousing a position quite favorable to public utilities. The third
article in this series, and quite possibly the only one with constructive
suggestions to make is Kadane, Zoning, Utilities, and Sweet Reason, 56 PUB.
Umn. FoRT. 792 (1955).
"'According to a leading appraiser, Worth Lutz of Durham Realty, electrical towers of the type proposed in Chapel Hill will cause approximately a
ten percent to twenty percent depreciation to undeveloped property, and
from twenty-five percent to fifty percent in areas which are already built up as
residential. Unfortunately, the Real Estate Appraisal Books and periodicals
have very little to say on this subject. According to Mr. Lutz, the above figures
are a "horseback opinion," and not final authority. Interview with Worth
Lutz, Appraiser with Durham Realty Co., Spring 1963.
"' State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783 (1953). See generally 6
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CO1PORATIONS § 24.09 (3d ed. 1949).
" 3 McQuiLLiN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 1034; N.C. GENr. STAT. § 160172 (1953) (Enabling Act). It is arguable that a municipality may,
within the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-174 (1953), enact zoning
regulations such as those here proposed. That section provides, "such
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other
things, as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality."
See State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); Turner v. New
Bern, 187 N.C. 541, 122 S.E. 469 (1924); N.C. GEx. STAT. § 160-172 to -174.
" For a general discussion of aesthetic zoning and its historical development, see Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives; A Reappraisal,
20 LAw & CONTEmp. PRon. 218 (1955). The traditional rule in regard to
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An excellent example of such reluctance is provided by the "billboard cases." The early attempts to regulate billboards were held
2
invalid on the ground that their primary objective was aesthetic. 1
In 1911 a billboard ordinance was upheld on the ground that billboards endangered the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. 2 If one could believe that billboards were actually responsible
for all that was attributed to them, then one would find the decision
rested on firm ground. Obviously such reasoning was specious and
avoided the question of aesthetics.23 The attempt to fit the regulation of unsightly structures into the traditional limits of the police
power was echoed in a recent Ohio decision. 4 In that case the court
upheld an ordinance regulating high tension towers on the ground
that they presented a grave danger to public safety. The court gave
a clue as to the underlying rationale of the decision in dictum. The
court stated that it was not primarily concerned with aesthetics when
it rejected the utility's contention that there was no reason to require
underground installation of wires.25

aesthetic zoning was that it could not be used as the sole criteria, but that it
could bear some weight in considering the validity of an ordinance based
on other grounds. Many courts have in the past applied what one writer
has termed "the Blindman Test"; that is, if the object regulated would not
be offensive or injurious to a blind man, then the regulation is based solely on
aesthetics and is unacceptable. Id. at 223.
1The early "billboard" ordinances were based strictly on aesthetics,
and because of this, they quickly fell. See, e.g., Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan.
756, 33 Pac. 476 (1893) ; People v. Green, 85 App. Div. 400, 83 N.Y. Supp.
460 (1903).
2 St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W.
929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). The court said that
the billboards led to prostitution of the lowest sort; gambling; dope addiction;
drunkenness; the spread of disease and filth; and various and assorted other
crimes.
2" Statistics introduced in another case indicate that the Missouri court
was struggling to fit the regulations within the traditional concepts of the
police power. A survey conducted by a master appointed by a Massachusetts

court established that while there were scattered instances of billboards being

conducive to crime, it was by no means as bad as the Missouri court indicated.
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass.
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
" State ex rel Cleveland Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159

N.E.2d 756 (1959). Ohio has reserved to municipalities the right to regu-

late the utilities. OHiO Rnv. CODE §§ 715.27, 4933.13, 4933.16, 4933.99 (1953).
2" State ex rel Cleveland Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, supra note 24, at
485, 159 N.E.2d at 760 (dictum). The Power Company contended that such

towers had an accident-free record going back many years. Their evidence was
accepted by the special master appointed in the case.
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Since those early cases there has been a growth of support behind the idea that zoning on aesthetic grounds is permissible.2 6 The
Supreme Court implied that zoning on aesthetic grounds would be
permissible under the police power in Berman v. Parker.Y1 In so
doing the Court expressed disfavor with the idea of an historically
limited interpretation of the scope of the police power, saying:
Public safety, public health, morality are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power
to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it .... The concept of the public welfare
28
is broad and inclusive.
Thus, the Supreme Court has placed the premium on the broad category of "public welfare."
Some writers have contended that the "city beautiful" is of itself
so desirable as to warrant zoning on purely aesthetic grounds. 9
Another writer has attempted to draw a correlation between aesthetics and public morality.3" The most powerful rebuttal to such
arguments, the Supreme Court notwithstanding, is that beauty is a
subjective thing and it would be undesirable to allow a group of
"The court said in Turner v. New Bern, 187 N.C. 54.1, 543, 122 S.E.
469, 471 (1924), that "the uniform trend of legislation in regard to municipalities which are coming to be viewed not only as instrumentalities for the enforcement of law and order, but for the abolition of unsightly places and sounds
and for the enforcement not only of the physical conveniences such as lights,
water and sewerage, but for the preservation and improvement of the surroundings that will be pleasing to the eye and make the city more desirable as a place
of residence." 8 MCQUILLIx, op. cit. supra note 18, § 25.31; 2 METzENBAUm,
LAW OF ZONING, 1579 (2d ed. 1955) ; RHYNF, MUNICIPAL LAW, §§ 26-4, 32-24
(1953); YoxLEY, ZONING LAw & PRAcTIca § 17.1 (Supp. 1963); 1960 DUKE
L.J. 299.
2 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (dealing with an urban renewal action). Said the
Court, "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy...." Id. at 33.
81d.
I at 32.
"Dukeminier, supra note 20, at 218. As a general discussion of the
history and objectives of aesthetic zoning, that is the best article in print.
Unfortunately, Mr. Dukeminier believes that zoning commissioners and the
courts should become the conditioning agents through which the masses' appreciation of the beautiful is elevated. He seems to be totally obsessed with the
idea of beauty, per se.
'. Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Vahws: Does Zoning Promote the
Public welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949). Mr. Sayre argues that aesthetics
are so intrically intermingled with the creation of a healthy moral climate
that they should stand on equal footing. Once he leaves his philosophical discussion behind, and relates aesthetics to property values, he makes a convincing argument.
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municipal officials to force upon the public their personal view of
what is aesthetically pleasing. There should be a more objective
standard which would work toward implementing the underlying
motives for allowing such regulation.
While the tendency may be toward recognition of aesthetics as a
proper basis for zoning,"1 there is no doubt that North Carolina is
still firmly aligned with the traditional view in this matter. In State
v. Brown,"2 the North Carolina Court declared unconstitutional a
statute regulating junk yards 3 on the ground that the statute was
based solely on aesthetics. There is little doubt that the court was
correct in its conclusion as to the basis of the statute. However, the
court left room for speculation that it would uphold an ordinance
dealing indirectly with aesthetics, saying: "[W]e know of no authority that vests our courts with the power to uphold a statute or
regulation based purely on aesthetic grounds without any real or
substantial relation to the public health, safety or morals, or the
general welfare."3 4 The court went on to cite the time-honored
rule3 5 that while aesthetic considerations alone are not enough to
bring a regulation within the police power, if the regulation is posited
on another factor, the fact that aesthetics played a part in the adoption of the law will not invalidate it.
The criteria set forth by North Carolina in the above case may
be met when a regulation such as that under consideration is bottomed on protection of property values. A fundamental purpose of
zoning is to preserve and enhance property values, and to encourage
the best possible use of land. 6 Recently Wisconsin upheld an ordi'" See 2 METZENDAUM, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1579; YoxtLy, op. cit.
supra note 26, § 17.1.
32250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959). For a critical appraisal of this
case, see 1960 DuKE L.J. 299. It is interesting to note that twenty-five years
earlier, North Carolina appeared to have taken the lead in aesthetic zoning.
Turner v. New Bern, 187 N.C. 541, 122 S.E. 469 (1924).

N.C.GEN.

STAT.

§ 14-399 (1953).

,State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 59, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1959). (Emphasis
added.)
"Dukeminier, supra note 20, at 218.
See generally 8 McQumLLIN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 25.25, 39
MARQ. L. Rzv. 135 (1955), discusses the growing trend of courts to
regard protection of market values of property as a proper objective
of the police power. New Jersey has said that a proper objective of zoning
is to encourage the best possible use of land, and to protect property values,
saying, "The proper purpose of zoning is 'Conserving the value of the
property and encouraging the most appropriate use of the land.'" Griggs v.
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nance empowering a zoning board to deny a building permit to any
proposed structure so out of harmony with the neighborhood as to
cause a decline in property values. 7 The court reasoned that this
was within the police power in that the general welfare of the public
is affected by anything tending to destroy property values and thus
reduce the tax base. The court felt that the traditional limitations
on the police power were not completely restrictive, and that the court
could interpret the general welfare provisions in accord with changing conditions. The Wisconsin view seems to be in harmony with
the position adopted by the Supreme Court. 8
It is apparent that the location of high tension towers in a
residential neighborhood would substantially lessen the property
values of the area.," Admittedly, the condemnation awards granted
for the acquisition of right of way will compensate the present owners
to some degree, but the brunt of the damage will be felt when the
then owners attempt to sell their property. At that time the true
extent of the permanent injury to the property values will become
apparent.
Perhaps the most realistic view yet taken on this matter was
enunciated in a 1923 Louisiana decision. 40 That court recognized
the inescapable interaction of aesthetics and property values and said
that if a city could use its police power to suppress that which was
bothersome to the nose and ear, then that power should extend to
the control of that which is offensive to the eye, and concomitantly,
to the value of property in the neighborhood. 41 The court expressly
City of Patterson, 132 N.J.L. 145, 147, 39 A.2d 231, 232 (1944). Accord,
Gabrielson v. Borough of Glen Ridge, 13 N.J. Misc. 142, 176 A. 676 (Sup.
Ct. 1935). New York agrees with this view. Wulfson v. Burden, 241 N.Y.
288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
" State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Co. v. Weiland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955). It is interesting that even this court felt constrained to
stay within the traditional terms.
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
96Interview with Worth Lutz, Appraiser with Durham Realty Co., Spring
1963.
State ex ret Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
""The beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is
for the comfort and happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general
way the value of the property in the neighborhood. It is therefore as much
a matter of general welfare as is any other condition that fosters comfort
or happiness, and consequent values generally of the property in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power avail, as well to suppress or prevent
a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight, as to suppress or
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recognized the effect which aesthetics plays in the valuation of
property. There can be but little doubt as to the opinion of that court
in regard to an ordinance regulating high tension towers.
A similar result based on protection of property values was
reached in Massachusetts. 4' The court found that the plaintiff's
activities would leave the property involved almost valueless, saying, "The effect of such an unsightly waste in a residential community can hardly be otherwise than to permanently depress values
of other lands in the neighborhood and to render them less desirable
for homes."14 The court concluded by stating that they would
give weight to aesthetic considerations in passing on the ordinance
involved.
In view of the language used by the Supreme Court in Berman
and by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the Brown decision,
it is entirely possible that if an ordinance such as that which Chapel
Hill proposed were grounded not on aesthetics, but on the protection
of property values, and met the test of reasonableness, it would be
upheld. In such a case, the fact that aesthetic considerations played
a part in the adoption of the ordinance would not be sufficient reason for declaring it to be invalid if another reason, recognized to
be within the concept of public welfare, could be shown to be the
prime reason.
Assuming that an ordinance designed to regulate the erection
and location of high tension towers is within the police power, a
question remains as to the reasonableness of its application. In the
situation under consideration, any workable solution must successfully balance the needs and interests of the municipality concerned
with those of the public utility seeking to effectively perform its
statutory duty. This necessarily entails a detailed consideration of the
effect of such an ordinance on the statewide consumer group involved.
prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of hearing, or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore in a neighborhood of residences might be as much
a public nuisance, and as ruinous to property values in the neighborhood
generally, as a disagreeable noise, or odor, or menace to safety or health."
Id. at 283, 97 So. at 444.
"'Burlington v. Dann, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied 326
U.S. 739 (1945). Massachusetts has long allowed some regulation to protect
property values. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising v. Department
of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297
U.S. 725 (1936); Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
" 318 Mass. at 221, 61 N.E.2d at 246 (1945).
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The factors which determine the reasonableness of a purely
local ordinance were best articulated by New Jersey." The criteria
set out by that court effectively balance the interests of all concerned.
The court ruled that the public utilities commission must find that
the particular site proposed by the utility is reasonably necessary
to the public on a statewide basis. In determining this question of
reasonableness, the court directed the commission to consider the
overall community zoning plan, the particular ordinances involved,
the general character of the neighborhood, and the effect of the proposed use thereon. The board was also instructed to take into consideration alternative sites and methods of installation available to
the utility, taking into account the competitive advantages and disadvantages of each, giving special note to the differences in cost to
the utility and the damage to the property at or along the proposed
site. These standards, while intended for the use of an administrative body, furnish excellent guidelines for a court in determining the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance in the same situation, and make
it apparent that a court applying these criteria could reach an
equitable solution within the accepted concepts of the "police
' 45
power."
Several states have enacted statutes specifically designed to deal
" New Jersey has adopted a statute dealing specifically with a problem of
municipal zoning powers and public utilities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-50

(1940), quoted in note 47, infra. One of the early cases decided under this
statute set forth criteria to be applied in determining the reasonableness of a
zoning ordinance as applied to a public utility. Inre Hackensack Water Co.,
41 N.J. Super. 408, 125 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1956) (dealing with a proposed water tower with the town objecting on aesthetic grounds).
"'The criteria set out above were applied in a New Jersey case similar
to the Chapel Hill situation. In re Public Service Elec. & Gas Co. v. Borough
of Roselle, 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d 233 (1961). The municipality had adopted
two ordinances relating to the erection of power lines by public utilities. One
required that anyone wishing to erect transmission lines through the community obtain a Special Use Permit. The other required that all electric
lines carrying more than 33,000 volts be installed underground. The electric
company proposed to erect "H" type towers along an existing railroad right
of way. The municipality objected on the ground that such installation
would be unsightly, dangerous, and would wreck property values in the
locale. The court agreed with the commission's finding that in that particular situation, the town's contentions were groundless. The board found
that it would cost much more to use an alternative method of installation.
The municipality was obviously in a weak position in regard to damage to
property values, inasmuch as the property was bordering an existing railway.
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with this conflict.4" While it is possible, as demonstrated above, to
reach a solution to this problem through the extant common law,
it is suggested that statutory solution is the most appropriate method
for settling the conflict. The New Jersey statute is typical of the
group.47 It provides that the public utility is subject to reasonable
zoning ordinances, but vests in the Public Utility Commission the
power to review the application of the ordinance on petition of the
utility concerned. If the commission determines that the ordinance
is unreasonable as applied to the particular situation, then it may
exempt the utility from compliance therewith. There is a further
appeal to the courts from the commission decision. This method
leaves the public utility commission in primary control, while providing for a balancing of all the interests affected by the ordinance. 48
If the commission finds that the property damage outweighs the
benefit to be gained from the particular site or route, taking into
consideration the alternates available to the utility, then it will
refuse to exempt the utility from the ordinance.4 The converse is
naturally true.
' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. 16-235 (1958); MASS. ANN. LAWS,
ch. 40A, § 10 (1961) ; ME.:Zv. STAT. ANN., ch. 91 § 93 (1954) ; N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. 31:62 (!955). Kadane, Zoning, Utilities and Sweet Reason,
56 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 792 (1955), provides an excellent discussion of these
statutes and the minor differences in them. It should be noted that Mr.
Kadane is General Counsel for Long Island Lighting Co. There have not
been many cases brought under the statutes. But see Jennings v. Connecticut
Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 130 A.Zd 535 (1954) (in favor of utility);
but cf., Greenwich Gas Co. v. Tuthill, 113 Conn. 684, 155 A. 850 (1931)
(upholding an ordinance when substantial property damages otherwise).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-50 (1940) provides: "This article or any ordinance or regulation made under authority thereof, shall not apply to existing
property or to buildings or to structures used or to be used by public utilities
in furnishing service, if upon petition of the public utility, the board of
public utility commissioners shall after a hearing, of which the municipality
affected shall have notice, decide that the present or proposed situation of the
building or structure in question is reasonably necessary for the service, convenience or welfare of the public."
" 8 In In re Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 424, 125 A.2d
281, 289 (App. Div. 1956), the court said: "[I]ntent is...clear that
the Legislature did not intend the local regulation to be overridden willynilly in all cases." By way of illustration, the court posed the case of a
power company selecting a site in the middle of a residential area when there
are equally suitable sites available in other localities. In this case, said the
court, the zoning ordinance should stand.
' It must be remembered that it was a New Jersey court which so strongly
stated the idea that one of the main functions of zoning is to protect property
values. Griggs v. City of Patterson, 132 N.J.L. 145, 39 A.2d 231 (1944).
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It is to be expected that as the consumer demand for electricity
and other services furnished by public utility companies increases,
the conflict discussed above will recur with increasing frequency. As
pointed out above, a workable solution to the problem can be reached
within the framework of the common law by positing zoning ordinances on protection of property values. However, it is submitted
that the statutory solution adopted in several jurisdictions provides a
more workable solution consistent with the best interests of all
parties involved.
C. A.

POWELL

III

It should also be remembered that any added cost to the utility because of a
municipal zoning ordinance, will eventually be passed on to the consumer. In
regard to requiring underground installation of power lines, it should be
noted that the high cost of right of way through highly valued property
would be reduced to a minimum.

